Speech and Taxes: Balancing Freedom of Conscience and Government Speech after Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association by Morrissey, Brian P.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 81
Issue 5 Symposium: The (Re)Turn to History in
Religion Clause Law and Scholarship
Article 9
6-1-2006
Speech and Taxes: Balancing Freedom of
Conscience and Government Speech after Johanns
v. Livestock Marketing Association
Brian P. Morrissey
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian P. Morrissey, Speech and Taxes: Balancing Freedom of Conscience and Government Speech after Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2059 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol81/iss5/9
SPEECH AND TAXES: BALANCING FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
AFTER JOHANNS v. LIVESTOCK MARKETING
ASSOCIATION
Brian P. Mornissey, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
Does the government have the power to compel a targeted group
of citizens to bear the costs of disseminating its own speech, even if it
speaks anonymously? According to the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,I the government does. In a
case that saw the two evolving First Amendment doctrines of "com-
pelled subsidization" and "government speech" collide, the Court
held that while the state cannot compel individuals to finance private
speech they disagree with, there is no limit, under any circumstances,
to the state's power to compel individuals to finance government
speech, even when it conflicts with their beliefs. 2 This Note seeks to
find one.
Perhaps you recall the baritone voice bellowing from your televi-
sion set over the tune of Aaron Copeland's Rodeo, "Beef. It's What's
For Dinner."3 Hard as it is to believe, the long and arduous legal bat-
tle that brought Livestock Marketing before the Court began with this
seemingly innocuous jingle. This and other "beef ads" were created
under a program designed by the Beef Promotion and Research Act
of 1985 (Beef Act) 4 to promote the consumption of beef as a generic
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.A., Political
Science, College of the Holy Cross, 2004. Thank you to Professor Richard W. Garnett
for his encouragement and invaluable insight, to the members of the Notre Dame Law
Review for their tireless efforts in preparing this work for publication, and most of all,
to my family for their love and support in this endeavor and beyond.
1 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
2 Id. at 562-63.
3 Id. at 554.
4 Pub. L. No. 99-198, §1601(b), 99 Stat. 1354, 1597-98 (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§2901 (2000)).
2059
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
commodity. 5 This "checkoff" program, as it was called, imposed a
mandatory tax on all cattle sales and imports to finance its activities. 6
The Beef Act vested control over the program in the Secretary of Agri-
culture, who established a Beef Board, a committee of beef industry
representatives that, among other things, developed the beef ads at
issue in the case.7 The mandatory tax was the exclusive source of
funding for the beef ads, and it was imposed exclusively on beef pro-
ducers.8 Congress's purpose for establishing the program was to com-
pensate for the lack of advertising by beef producers, who tend to be
small proprietors without sufficient resources to market their product
to a wide audience.9
Two associations of cattle ranchers objected to the tax, not as an
improper economic regulation, but as a violation of their First
Amendment rights. They claimed to disagree with the content of the
Beef Board's ads and, consequently, they argued that the government
could not compel them to contribute to the Beef Board's activities.1 0
At first, this claim might seem implausible. After all, cattle ranch-
ers produce beef and the ads simply encouraged people to buy it.
Nevertheless, the ranchers argued the Beef Board's ads impeded their
efforts because the ads treated beef as a generic commodity, hamper-
ing their ability to market their own products as unique.11 While this
still might not appear to be adequate grounds for a First Amendment
objection, the Court had recently held that a plaintiff group with a
nearly identical dispute had the right to not subsidize private expres-
sion it disagreed with, even if that disagreement was only "minor."'12
In Livestock Marketing, however, the Court held that the same rule did
not apply because, in this case, the ads belonged to the government,
and the government is free to say what it will.13
The ranchers vehemently disagreed with that classification, argu-
ing that the beef ads consisted of private speech they could not be
compelled to support against their will. The ranchers rejected the
idea that the ads could be classified as government speech for two
5 Livestock Mktg., 554 U.S. 553-54.
6 7 U.S.C. §,2904(8)).
7 544 U.S. at 553-54.
8 Id. at 554.
9 7 U.S.C. § 2901(a)-(b); Brief for the Petitioners at 2-3, Livestock Mktg., 544
U.S. 550 (Nos. 03-1164 & 03-1165), 2004 WL 1876289; see Daniel E. Troy, Do We Have
a Beef with the Court?: Compelled Commercial Speech Upheld, but It Could Have Been Worse,
2005 CATO SuP. CT. REV. 125, 138-40.
10 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 555-56.
11 Id. at 556.
12 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410-11 (2001).
13 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 559.
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reasons. First, they argued that the government is only entitled to
speak when it does so as a representative of all the people. Since the
beef ads were financed by taxes imposed on beef producers alone
rather than the nation at large, they argued that the government was
not speaking in that capacity. 14 Second, they argued that the beef ads
were not government speech because they did not identify the govern-
ment as the source of their message. I5 Instead, they purported to be
"Funded by America's Beef Producers.
1 6
The Court rejected the ranchers' arguments and held that the
beef ads were indeed government speech because the government re-
tained ultimate control over their message. As long as the govern-
ment exercises control over its message, it explained, the government
retains the power to compel taxpayers to subsidize its speech, even if
they disagree. 17 Even when the government only compels a targeted
group of taxpayers to subsidize its speech and even when the govern-
ment does not identify itself as the speaker, the Court explained that
the speech will be treated as government speech "exempt" from First
Amendment review.
18
This Note contends that this rule sweeps too broadly and affords
excessive power to the government-as-speaker. It is indisputable that
the government has the power to compel citizens to subsidize its
speech in a variety of cases. However, not all compelled subsidies can
be "exempt" from First Amendment review as the Court asserts. This
Note argues that the Beef Act was permissible only because it com-
pelled beef producers to subsidize commercial advertisements by the
government. Had the Act instead compelled the beef producers to
subsidize government speech of a political or ideological bent, the Act
would have violated the First Amendment unless the ads identified the
government as the speaker. Government can only impose taxes to fi-
nance government speech when it remains accountable for the mes-
sage. However, the government loses all accountability when it speaks
anonymously about an ideological topic, particularly when it uses tax
dollars extracted from a small minority to do so.
Part I of this Note reviews the individual right not to be com-
pelled to speak or subsidize speech by others. The Court has held
14 Id. at 562.
15 Id. at 564.
16 Id. at 555. The ads did contain a small graphic of a checkmark with the word
"BEEF." Id. at 555. However, it was not argued that this small designation was suffi-
cient to put viewers on notice that the ads were produced by the government. Id. at
577 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 561-62 (majority opinion).
18 Id. at 553, 560-66.
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that individuals may not be compelled to subsidize a private group's
speech unless the speech is germane to a compelling state interest.
Part I explains why the individual does not enjoy a similar right not to
subsidize government speech. The government must have the ability
to speak to its citizens and, necessarily, must compel citizens to pay for
that speech even when some of them disagree. However, the govern-
ment is only justified in imposing this burden on individual con-
sciences when it remains accountable for its message.
Part III examines Livestock Marketing and the ranchers' argument
that the Beef Act was unconstitutional because the government was
not accountable for the ads produced under its auspices. In addition,
Part III concludes that the Court was correct to reject that argument
and label the ads government speech, even though the Beef Act's
checkoff program was financed by a targeted tax rather than a general
one, and even though the government did not identify itself as the
speaker. However, Part III also concludes that in cases where the gov-
ernment speaks anonymously without a realistic chance of rebuttal,
the government distorts the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, Part
IV suggests that while commercial speech by the government will al-
ways be rebutted, even when it is anonymous, ideological and anony-
mous government speech will not. Thus, Part IV proposes a rule that,
in order to stay within the bounds of the First Amendment, ideologi-
cal government speech must either be paid for with a general tax or,
in the alternative, must clearly identify the government as the speaker.
I. THE RIGHT NOT To PAY FOR OTHERS' SPEECH-A MATTER
OF CONSCIENCE
The Court has explained that the reason why individuals have the
right not to subsidize private speech they disagree with is because do-
ing so would infringe upon their freedom of belief. 19 However, the
First Amendment does not grant individuals a similar right not to sub-
sidize government speech, regardless of whether they disagree. Pri-
marily, this is because the injury to the individual's freedom of belief
is outweighed by society's interest in hearing what the government has
to say. Thus, if a limit to the government's power to compel targeted
groups to subsidize its anonymous speech exists, that limit must stem
from some First Amendment principle other than the individual free-
dom of belief in which the Court has traditionally based the individ-
ual's right not to subsidize speech. This Note submits that such a limit
19 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (citations
omitted).
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does exist, and that it stems from the First Amendment principle of
preserving the marketplace of ideas.
A. The Right Not To Speak
The purpose of the First Amendment cannot be reduced to a sin-
gle phrase, but preserving the freedoms of belief and expression are
among its primary goals. 20  Compelled speech violates the First
Amendment because it interferes with these two freedoms. The First
Amendment presumes every citizen has certain natural rights upon
which the state has no power to intrude. Among those rights is the
freedom of belief, the individual's right to define his own beliefs free
from state control.21 The First Amendment presumes the individual's
pursuit of self-discovery is essential to the human experience and con-
sequently restrains the state from requiring individuals to affirm, con-
vey, or even subsidize beliefs they disagree with.
22
Similarly but separately, the First Amendment prohibits the state
from requiring any individual to support a belief he disagrees with
because others, as a result, might attribute that belief to the individ-
ual. This would intrude on his right to select his own image to present
to the world around him-his freedom of belief.
23
In addition to protecting individual freedoms, the First Amend-
ment also protects the integrity of the marketplace of ideas in order to
preserve society's interest in a free and robust public debate. 24 On
one level, the First Amendment presumes the free exchange of ideas
will encourage the pursuit of knowledge for its own good. More
pragmatically, it presumes the same free exchange of ideas is neces-
sary to provide citizens with the information necessary to participate
in democratic life.25 In either case, the First Amendment seeks to re-
strain government from distorting the market.
Although the cases that follow discuss the right against compelled
speech and the right against compelled subsidization of speech as a
matters of individual liberty rather than market distortion, compelled
speech can indeed distort the marketplace of ideas. First, when indi-
20 Thomas 1. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878-82 (1963).
21 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 627-29
(1982).
22 See infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
23 See Redish, supra note 21, at 601-04.
24 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28, excerpted in THE FirsT
AMENDMENT 101, 101-03 (John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer eds., 1996).
25 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in the judgment); Emerson, supra note 20, at 882-84.
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viduals are compelled to affirm ideas they disagree with, those ideas
gain a market share disproportionate to the actual public support they
would otherwise command. Second, individuals compelled to affirm
another entity's message may be chilled from subsequently affirming
their own. Thus, although the Court has not yet focused on it, the risk
that compelled speech will distort the market nevertheless exists and
may yet illuminate the decision in Livestock Marketing.
It is universally understood that the First Amendment protects
the freedom of speech. Less obviously, perhaps, the freedom of
speech also includes the freedom not to speak, and the First Amend-
ment protects both with equal vigor.2 6
The Court first articulated the individual's right not to be com-
pelled to speak in the landmark case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.27 In Barnette, the Court struck down a school
board resolution requiring all students to salute the American flag or
face expulsion after a group of Jehovah's witnesses objected on relig-
ious grounds.28 The Court found that the compelled salute required
students to "affirm[] . . . a belief and an attitude of mind,"29 and im-
permissibly interfered with the students' "right to differ as to things
that touch the heart of the existing order" and was unconstitutional. 30
The compelled salute violated the First Amendment because it
infringed on the students' freedom of belief and freedom of expres-
sion. The salute interfered with the students' freedom of belief by
requiring them to affirm a state viewpoint that they did not arrive at of
their own free will. 31 It interfered with the students' freedom of ex-
pression by forcing them to affirm this viewpoint publicly, in front of
their peers.32 Consequently, the image they presented to the outside
world was shaped by government control.33
26 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988)
(discussing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977), and Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)); cf. Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman,
348 F.3d 157, 163 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding speech compulsions to be even more sus-
pect than speech restrictions because "[i] t is one thing to force someone to close her
mouth; it is quite another to force her to become a mouthpiece").
27 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28 Id. at 628-29.
29 Id. at 633.
30 Id. at 642.
31 See id. at 633.
32 See id.
33 See id at 641.
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Nevertheless, the Court found that the greatest flaw in the com-
pelled salute was that it interfered with the students' consciences.
3 4
The Court remained silent on the risk that the salute would associate
the students with the school board's message or distort the market-
place of ideas.
Thirty-four years later, the Court found thatjust as the state could
not compel students to affirm a belief they disagreed with, it could
not compel automobile drivers to convey one either. In Wooley v. May-
nard,3 5 the Court struck down a New Hampshire law requiring all state
license plates to bear the motto "'Live Free or Die."' 36 A Jehovah's
Witness named Maynard objected on religious grounds.3 7 The New
Hampshire statute did not require Maynard to actually affirm the gov-
ernment message, but simply required him to carry it on his automo-
bile. 38 Even though the risk that the message would be attributed to
Maynard was uncertain, the Court struck the statute down because,
like the school board resolution in Barnette, the license plate require-
ment compelled Maynard to serve as an "instrument for fostering pub-
lic adherence to an ideological point of view" with which he
disagreed. 39 Thus, the Court had again characterized the individual's
right against compelled speech as an extension of his freedom of
belief.
40
The Court was not unanimous in that position. Justice Rehnquist
wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that the requirement did not violate
the First Amendment because there was no risk that New Hampshire's
message would be attributed to Maynard.41 To Justice Rehnquist, the
individual had no right against compelled speech unless the state in-
34 Id. at 642 ("[N]o official ... can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion ... .
35 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
36 Id. at 707.
37 Id. at 707-08.
38 Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 715 (majority opinion).
40 Id. (finding that the statute "'invade[d]'" the plaintiff's "'sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . .. to reserve from all
official control'") (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1942)); see Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1087, 1113 (2005) ("Interference with freedom of
belief was also central to the decision in Wooley v. Maynard. . . ."); id. at 1109 ("The
Supreme Court's early compelled speech decisions reflected the idea that compelled
speech violates dissenters' freedom of belief.").
41 See Maynard, 430 U.S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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fringed on both his freedom of belief and his freedom of
expression.
42
Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the facts in Wooley is persuasive; the
risk that New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto would be attrib-
uted to Maynard was minimal. 43 As long as it is generally understood
that all license plates are produced by the state, it would be illogical to
assume that a motorist supports the message. The message belongs to
the state that issued the plate. By rejecting Justice Rehnquist's posi-
tion that a message be attributed to the dissenter before he can claim
a right not to carry it, the Court in Wooley implied that the right
against compelled speech is primarily a function of the dissenter's
freedom of belief, and that even state action that merely requires an
individual to act as an "instrument" of a message he objects to would
violate the First Amendment.
44
B. The Right Not To Pay for Others' Speech
After Wooley, the Court was forced to define what, precisely, being
forced to serve as an "instrument" of a message meant. One month
later, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,45 the Court found that be-
ing compelled to pay for speech with which one disagreed satisfied
that definition. 46 In Abood, the Detroit Board of Education entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with a teachers' union certify-
ing the union as the exclusive representative of all Detroit teachers.
47
42 Id. at 721 (contending that the statute did not fall "within the ambit of Bar-
nette" because it did not require the motorist to affirm a belief).
43 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association ?, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2005) (" [T]he fundamental wrong of compelled speech ...
does not depend ... on outsiders possibly misunderstanding a person's compelled
speech as his own. It has more to do with the illicit influence [it] may have on the
character and autonomous thinking process of the compelled speaker .... ).
44 For an alternative to the Court's solution, see Note, The Curious Relationship
Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2411,
2428 (2004) (proposing that compelled speech requirements germane to an other-
wise legitimate government program should be upheld simply as a form of
regulation).
45 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
46 Id. at 233-35. I refer to the Court's "compelled subsidization" doctrine as an
extension of its doctrine on compelled speech. However, there are strong arguments
that this should not be the case. See Klass, supra note 40, at 1110 (finding that "com-
pelled subsidization . . .causes individual dissenters none of the First Amendment
harms caused by compelled speech"). But see Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Ex-
pression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 166-67 (2002) (treating
both compelled speech and compelled subsidization under the same umbrella of
"compelled expression").
47 431 U.S. at 211-12.
2o66 [VOL. 81:5
SPEECH AND TAXES
The agreement contained an "agency shop" clause requiring teachers
who did not join the union to nevertheless pay service charges to the
union equal to the dues paid by actual members.48 Congress author-
ized the use of agency shop clauses in public employment contracts
because it found that they were necessary to the collective bargaining
process and that collective bargaining was necessary to ensure stable
labor relations. 49 The fear was that without such clauses, many teach-
ers would decide not to join the union, knowing they could still "free
ride" on its efforts.50 Thus, the agency shop clause compelled them to
contribute.
A group of teachers objected to the service charges and filed suit,
arguing that the government could not compel them to fund the
union's social and political activities because those activities were un-
related to its collective bargaining function.51 The teachers' com-
plaint differed from the complaints in Barnette and Wooley in three
respects. First, the teachers objected to being made the instruments
of private speech by the union, not speech by the government. Sec-
ond, they argued that the forced payments not only compelled them
to support a message, but also compelled them to associate with a
private group against their will. Third, they were only compelled to
support the union's message by paying for it; they were not compelled
to affirm or convey it. As a result, the Court acknowledged that the
agency shop clause did interfere with the teachers' First Amendment
rights, but found that interference justified by the state interest in pro-
tecting collective bargaining.52 Since all teachers benefited from the
union's collective bargaining functions, the state had the power to
compel the teachers to pay for those activities.53 However, the state
did not have the power to compel the teachers to contribute to any
union activities unrelated to that goal.5 4 In articulating what would
become an oft-quoted test, the Court held that the state could only
compel teachers to fund union speech "germane" to collective bar-
gaining, the state interest that justified the interference with their
First Amendment rights. 55
The Court in Abood found that the First Amendment afforded the
dissenting teachers less protection than the dissenters in Wooley and
48 Id. at 211.
49 Id. at 220-22.
50 Id. at 222.
51 Id. at 212-13.
52 Id. at 222.
53 See id. at 223.
54 Id. at 222-23.
55 Id. at 235-36.
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Barnette because being compelled to finance a message against one's
will is less offensive than being compelled to affirm it or carry it on
one's property.56 Nevertheless, the Court still suggested that the ex-
tent of the teacher's First Amendment protection stemmed from the
same source as the dissenters in the two prior cases-their freedom of
belief.
57
On its facts, Wooley's holding was narrow-the state could not
compel Maynard to carry its message on his car.58 However, Wooley's
reasoning was much broader. The Court did not describe Maynard's
right as simply the right not to carry a state message in public. In-
stead, it called it a right "to refuse to foste?' an "idea [he found] mor-
ally objectionable. '59 Read in conjunction with Abood, that suggests
that the right not to "foster" speech includes the right not to even be
made to pay for it.
Due to the fact that the agency shop clause in Abood compelled
the teachers to contribute to the union, it implicated their freedom to
associate as well as their freedom not to speak. The First Amendment
protects the individual's right to associate with other people for ex-
pressive purposes. This is a function of both the freedom of belief
and the freedom of expression-associating with others helps an indi-
vidual advance his own beliefs, and being associated with a group ex-
presses much about the individual member. 60
In Abood, the Court explained that just as the freedom of speech
includes the freedom not to speak, the freedom of association in-
cludes the freedom not to associate. 61 It determined that the agency
shop clause intruded on that right.6 2 Nevertheless, despite this ac-
knowledgment, the Court remained focused on the clause's intrusion
upon the teachers' freedom of belief.63 The Court cited Barnette's oft-
56 Id.; see also Klass, supra note 40, at 1116 (arguing that paying a mandatory fee is
of "too little moral content" to qualify as an injury to First Amendment rights).
57 Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-36.
58 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).
59 Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
60 EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 579 (2d ed.
2005); Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression
of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1855 (2001) (describing voluntary association as
an expressive act).
61 431 U.S. at 233-35.
62 Id. at 233-34.
63 Id. at 234-35. The Court did refer to the holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 22 (1976), holding that the act of making a voluntary contribution was protected
expression. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234. From that, the Court extrapolated that the teach-
ers' making a mandatory contribution to the union implicated the same expressive
right. Id. Beyond that, however, the Court emphasized the agency shop clause's im-
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quoted claim, "' [i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox . . . or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein,'" 64 and then explained that just as the state has no power to
compel an individual to affirm a belief, it has no power to compel him
"to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as
a condition of holding a job."
6 5
After Abood, the Court considered other cases in which dissenters
objected to being made "instruments" of messages with which they
disagreed. Interestingly, in all of these cases, the Court discussed the
individual's right not to foster objectionable speech as a function of
more than just her freedom of belief, but of her freedom of expres-
sion and society's interest in an undistorted marketplace of ideas as
well. 66 Still, the Court was unclear as to whether it had adopted an
pact on the teachers' freedom of belief, implying that the harm arising from their
compelled subsidization of the union's speech was simply a new manifestation of the
harm associated with actually being compelled to speak, as in Barnette. Id. at 234-35
(describing the principle "at the heart of the First Amendment" that an individual's
beliefs should be "shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State").
64 Id. at 235 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
65 Id.
66 In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), a mall owner ob-
jected to the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the state constitution as
requiring him to permit individuals to distribute leaflets at the mall. Id. at 78-79.
Justice Rehnquist, now writing for the majority, rejected the notion that the
leafleteers' message would be attributed to the mall owner and thus rejected his First
Amendment claim. Id. at 88.
In Pacfic Gas & Electrical Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), the
utility company PG&E objected to a state regulatory order requiring it to include a
pamphlet from a hostile consumer advocacy group along with the monthly bill and
newsletter it sent its customers. Id. at 5-7. A plurality rejected PG&E's claim, but in
doing so, discussed the First Amendment question as one impacting the utility's free-
doms of belief, its freedom of expression, and the marketplace of ideas. As to PG&E's
freedom of belief, the plurality found that the order required PG&E to "use its prop-
erty as a vehicle for spreading a message with which it disagrees." Id. at 17 (plurality
opinion). As to PG&E's freedom of expression, the plurality found that, by being
forced to carry the consumer advocacy group's pamphlet, PG&E might feel "imper-
missible pressure" to respond to the group's speech. Id. at 15 n.l1. As to the risk of
distorting the marketplace of ideas, the Court found that the danger that PG&E
would alter its own speech in response to the order was "antithetical to the free discus-
sion that the First Amendment seeks to foster." Id. at 16.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995), a parade organizer objected to Massachusetts's attempt to require the orga-
nizer to permit a gay rights group to march in its parade under the auspices of the
State's antidiscrimination in public accommodations statute. Id. at 561. The Court
2o692oo6]
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approach akin to Justice Rehnquist's in Wooley, that conscientious ob-
jection alone is not sufficient to trigger an individual right against
compelled speech, or whether it had simply come to understand that
the right against compelled speech could be implicated by any one of
these three interests. In either event, the Court's new analysis of the
compelled speech question never migrated to the compelled subsidi-
zation cases following Abood. Instead, those decisions have offered
nothing to rebut Aboods suggestion that the dissenter's right against
compelled subsidization of speech is simply a function of her freedom
of belief.
For example, in Keller v. State Bar of California,67 a group of attor-
neys objected to being compelled to contribute to the State Bar Asso-
ciation. 68 The Court held fast to Abood, explaining that California
could compel attorneys to associate with and contribute to the State
Bar Association in order to aid the State Bar Association's efforts to
self-regulate the legal industry, which the Court deemed to be a com-
pelling state interest.69 However, as in Abood, the Court held that Cali-
fornia could not compel attorneys to contribute to the State Bar
Association's political activities that were not "germane" to those ef-
forts, such as lobbying for gun control laws.
70
The Court in Keller did not stray from Abood's conclusion that the
primary First Amendment injury suffered by an individual compelled
to finance another group's speech is the injury to her freedom of be-
lief.71 Undoubtedly, the fact that the dissenting attorneys' mandatory
contribution publicly associated them with the Bar against their will
was an injury itself, but the Court focused more on the dissenters'
upheld the organizer's claim, finding that Massachusetts could not enforce its antidis-
crimination law in this context because the organizer enjoyed the "autonomy to
choose the content of his own message," id. at 573, and the "right ... to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another," id. at 574.
67 496 U.S. 1 (1990). In Keller, as in Abood, the Court held that California could
not compel attorneys to contribute to the State Bar Association's expressive activities
unless the activities were germane to a compelling state interest. Id. at 13-14. It
found that California's interests in "regulating the legal profession" and "improving
the quality of the legal services" were sufficiently compelling. Id. at 13.
68 Id. at 4.
69 Id. at 13-14.
70 Id. at 14, 16; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991).
The Court announced a three-part test that, while seemingly designed for future ap-
plication, has not been implemented in the Court's three compelled subsidization
cases since: "[C]hargeable activities must (1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining
activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and
avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop." Id. at 519.
71 See supra notes 56-57, 63-65 and accompanying text.
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consciences than public perceptions. 72 The key injury, the decision
implied, was that the attorneys were forced to become instruments of
a message with which they disagreed.
C. The Right Not To Pay for Others' Speech-Does the Right Extend to
Commercial Speech as Well?
The Court in Abood and Keller held that the dissenters in those
cases had a right not to subsidize political and ideological speech that
ran counter to their conscientiously held beliefs. Compelled support
of commercial advertisements such as those in Livestock Marketing,
however, pose a very different question. Commercial advertisements
simply propose a transaction and, historically, the Court has afforded
them less protection under the First Amendment. 73 After all, it is far
more difficult to demonstrate that an offer to sell goods conflicts with
one's belief system than that a political lobbying campaign does.
Prior to Livestock Marketing, the Court offered two divergent answers to
this question, leaving the debate wide open by the time that case fi-
nally reached the Court.
In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,74 the Court con-
fronted the first of three First Amendment challenges to various De-
partment of Agriculture checkoff programs. 75 The Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) gave the Secretary of Agri-
culture power to regulate several agricultural markets, including the
market for California tree fruit. 76 In furtherance of the Act, the Secre-
tary ordered California tree fruit handlers to adhere to uniform price,
grade, quality, and quantity standards77 and also initiated an advertis-
ing campaign espousing the virtues of "California Tree Fruit" as a ge-
neric commodity. 78  The campaign was designed to increase
advertising among a tree fruit market comprised of small proprietors
who could not afford to do so on their own.
79
72 Keller, 496 U.S. at 10 (acknowledging Thomas Jefferson's view that "'to compel
a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical"' (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 234-35 n.31 (1977)).
73 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980).
74 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
75 Id. at 460.
76 7 U.S.C. § 608(1) (2000).
77 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461-63.
78 Id. at 462.
79 Id. at 461, 462 & n.3; Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367,
1378-79 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd 521 U.S. 457.
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The Secretary appointed committees of industry representatives
to implement the orders,80 which were funded by a mandatory assess-
ment placed on all California tree fruit handlers.81 Each order re-
quired the approval of a supermajority of the affected producers
before it could be implemented.
8 2
A group of tree fruit handlers objected to the ads' message and
filed suit.8 3 They contended that the ads implied that "'all California
fruit is the same' ", a message adverse to their own claim that such fruit
was "highly varied," and that theirs was unique.
8 4
In a five-to-four decision, the Court rejected the handlers' claim
and rebuffed their analogy to Abood. The handlers argued that the
Secretary's orders compelled them to associate with the committee of
industry representatives against their will and that this was unconstitu-
tional because the committee's efforts to create and disseminate ads
for generic tree fruit were not "germane" to the goals of the Act.
8 5
The AMAA explained that its purpose was to "avoid unreasonable fluc-
tuations in supplies and prices, '8 6 and to pursue a policy of collective,
rather than competitive, marketing in the tree fruit industry.8 7 The
handlers argued that while the Act clearly authorized collective eco-
nomic regulation such as price controls, generic advertisements were
outside its scope.88 The Court was not to be persuaded. In fact, it
undertook only a cursory "germaneness" analysis before concluding
that because the AMAA created a collective enterprise that already
constrained the handlers' freedom to act independently in a signifi-
cant way, any additional infringement caused by their forced contribu-
tion to the ads was merely incidental.8 9 This was economic regulation,
not a compelled subsidy for private speech.90
80 See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 462.
81 Id. at 461-62.
82 7 U.S.C. § 608c(9) (B).
83 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 467.
84 Id. at 468 n.1I (quoting Brief for Respondents Gerawan Farming, Inc. et al. at
46, Glickman, 521 U.S. 457 (No. 95-1184), 1996 WL 554427). The dissenters also
claimed that the ads presented red nectarines, a fruit they did not grow, as superior.
Id. They also objected to a purported sexually subliminal message in one particular
ad that depicted a young girl in a wet bathing suit. Id. at 467 n.10.
85 Id. at 470-73.
86 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, 246-47
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 602(4) (2000)).
87 Id. (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 602 (2000)); Glickman, 521 U.S. at 461.
88 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470.
89 Id. at 469, 472-73.
90 Id. at 471.
[VOL. 81:52072
SPEECH AND TAXES
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens offered three reasons
why the compelled contribution did not cognizably injure the han-
dlers' First Amendment interests. First, he noted that the handlers
were not compelled to "repeat an objectionable message out of their
own mouths."91 Of course this was true, but neither were the teachers
in Abood, and the Court did recognize their First Amendment injury,
even though they were not forced to personally affirm the objectiona-
ble message. 92 Next, he explained that the contested message in this
case was not ideological.93 This seemed to be the dispositive factor in
Justice Stevens' view. Compelled support for commercial advertising,
he suggested, could not interfere with the freedom of thought Abood
sought to protect.
94
The Court's ultimate holding in Glickman was that the compelled
contributions for generic advertising that the AMAA required were
simply ancillary to its collectivist regulatory scheme. 95 That could be
interpreted as holding that the ads were "germane" to the Act's pur-
pose under Abood.96 However, Justice Stevens's swift treatment of the
germaneness question and the distinction he drew here between ideo-
logical and commercial speech strongly imply that compelled support
of commercial speech does not even raise Aboods gernmaneness con-
cerns because commercial speech is the type with which one can plau-
sibly disagree. In his words, such compelled contributions do not
force a "crisis of conscience.."
97
Finally, Justice Stevens found that the compelled contributions
were not likely to force the handlers to "respond to a hostile message
when they 'would prefer to remain silent.' ,98 In other words, because
the tree fruit ads were not directly attributed to these particular dis-
senters and because the commercial nature of the ads prevented them
from being "hostile" to any of the dissenters' conscientiously held be-
liefs, the dissenters would not feel morally compelled to respond and
publicly disavow their content.
91 Id. at 470-71.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
93 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469-70, 472. This fact distinguishes United Foods from
Wooley, supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text, and Pacific Gas & Electrical Co.,
supra note 66.
94 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470 n.14, 472.
95 Id. at 472-75.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 55, 85.
97 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 472.
98 Id. at 471 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88
(1980)); see supra note 66.
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In the end, the Court in Glickman agreed with Abood that the pri-
mary First Amendment interest injured by compelled subsidization of
speech is the dissenter's freedom of belief. However, it refused to ac-
cept the premise that a commercial ad could conflict with the kinds of
beliefs the First Amendment is concerned with. Instead, the Court
found such messages simply incapable of provoking a "crisis of
conscience."99
Four years later, in United States v. United Foods, Inc.,100 the Court
reviewed yet another agricultural checkoff program and paradoxi-
cally, reached the exact opposite conclusion. As in Glickman, the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, under statutory authority, required mushroom
farmers to pay a mandatory assessment to a council of industry repre-
sentatives who then allocated the proceeds to generic advertising cam-
paigns. 10 1 Unlike the regime in Glickman, advertising was the sole
purpose of this program; it was not ancillary to any larger collectivist
regulatory regime. Consequently, a group of mushroom farmers ob-
jected on First Amendment grounds. The Court upheld their claim,
finding that the program imposed a naked speech compulsion on
mushroom farmers that was not "germane" to any interest besides
Congress's intent to advertise for mushrooms, an interest that was not
sufficiently compelling to satisfy Abood.10 2
The Court attempted to distinguish Glickman by explaining that
the compelled advertising subsidy in that case was ancillary to a com-
plex regulatory framework, while this compelled subsidy stood on its
own-it was a forced payment for speech unattached to any other
goals.103 Simple enough, except that the Court in Glickman seemed to
suggest that compelled subsidies for commercial speech, whether they
be ancillary or alone, cannot raise First Amendment issues because
dissenters cannot plausibly claim to disagree with a commercial mes-
sage.1 0 4 The Court in United Foods surprisingly took the opposite posi-
tion. It rejected Glickman's apparent holding that a court could
objectively determine whether a particular message would provoke a
99 Id. at 472.
100 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
101 Id. at 408. The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information
Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6112 (2000), invalidated by United Foods, 533 U.S. 405,
authorized the Secretary to establish a Mushroom Council comprised of industry pro-
ducers and importers. Id. § 6104(a)-(b).
102 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-16.
103 Id. at 406.
104 See Klass, supra note 40, at 1106 ("[Glickman] attempted to establish . . . a
rule... that the compelled subsidization of commercial advertising cannot give rise
to a crisis of conscience and, as a result, cannot violate the First Amendment."); supra
text accompanying notes 93-94.
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"crisis of conscience," and instead concluded that "there is no appar-
ent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates [from
larger ones] ."105 Thus, it refused to accept the notion that compelled
financing of commercial speech could not raise a First Amendment
issue. Abood did not require speech to be political to be protected, it
explained. '
0 6
That is not to say that the Court held that compelled support for
the mushroom ads did provoke a crisis of conscience. Rather, it
stressed the prudence of keeping the courts out of the mind-reading
business, explaining that "the speaker and the audience" assess the
value of the information, "not the government."
10 7
Thus, at the time when Livestock Marketing reached the Court, it
was clear that the government could only compel individuals to subsi-
dize political or ideological private speech that was germane to a com-
pelling state interest. It was unclear whether that same restriction
applied to compelled support for private commercial advertising.
The regime challenged in Livestock Marketing was substantially similar
to the one struck down in United Foods. The Court in United Foods
characterized the mushroom ads produced under that regime as pri-
vate speech by the mushroom council and held that the government
could not compel dissenting mushroom farmers to subsidize them. In
Livestock Marketing, the government advanced a new theory, that the
beef ads were government speech. This new theory called for a new
rule and, as is often the case, the rules of the game change everything.
D. The Checkoff Programs-Private Advertising or Government Speech?
The Beef Act in Livestock Marketing created a regime strongly re-
sembling the one struck down in United Foods,108 and the ranchers
thus argued that United Foods, rather than Glickman, should apply.
0 9
The government's reply was as follows: the ads in Glickman and United
Foods were developed by committees of industry representatives that
were appointed by the Secretary. All parties involved in those cases
categorized the committees as private organizations engaging in pri-
vate speech. Now, however, the government argued that the more
accurate categorization of the committee at issue in this case (the Beef
105 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411.
106 Id. at 413.
107 Id. at 411.
108 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553-54, 558-59 (2005); id. at
571 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The ranchers' complaint is on all fours with the objec-
tion of the mushroom growers in United States v. United Foods." (citation omitted)).
109 Id. at 555-56 (majority opinion).
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Board) was as a government entity engaging in government speech.
The Court agreed,110 finding that because the committee was con-
trolled by a politically accountable government official (the Secre-
tary), its speech could be considered government speech.11
The Court's determination that the Secretary's control over the
Beef Board was sufficient to classify its speech as "government speech"
effectively discarded the more rigorous test two circuits had previously
used to answer the same question.11 2 Those circuits demanded that
the government demonstrate it actually exercised "editorial control"
over a message before they would label the message as "government
speech."'1 3 The government's mere statutory authority to control the
message if it chose to was insufficient. 114
The ranchers in Livestock Marketing seized on that line of reason-
ing, arguing that because the Secretary exercised only pro forma con-
trol over the beef ads, they were nothing more than private speech.
The Court disagreed, however, and found the Secretary's control suf-
110 Id. at 559. In so doing, the Court took up and endorsed an argument the
government had advanced too late in the United Foods litigation for it to be
considered.
111 The Court listed several factors as indicative of the Secretary's control: (1) the
Secretary "directed the implementation" of the advertising program, (2) she also
"specified, in general terms," the content of the ads, (3) every member of the Beef
Board was "answerable to the Secretary," and (4) the Secretary retained "final ap-
proval authority" over every ad disseminated under the campaign. Id. at 560-62.
112 Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-94
(8th Cir. 2000)), rev'd, sub nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550; Sons
of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d
610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).
113 Livestock Mktg., 335 F.3d at 719. In the absence of a Supreme Court holding,
most courts found that advertisements created under the agricultural checkoff pro-
grams were not government speech. Id. at 718 (citing Pelts & Skins L.L.C. v.Jenkins,
259 F. Supp. 2d 482 (M.D. La. 2003) (concluding that generic advertisements funded
by mandatory assessments were not government speech), In re Wash. State Apple Ad-
ver. Comm'n, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1305 (E.D. Wa. 2003) (same), and Mich. Pork
Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772, 785-89 (W.D. Mich.
2002) (same)).
114 Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621 (noting that there was only "one
occasion" where the DMV commissioner actually rejected a plate design); see also R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
state-produced advertisements critical of the tobacco industry and paid for by the use
of cigarette sales taxes were government speech because the government was clearly
identified as the speaker but cautioning that "[t] he analysis may differ when the gov-
ernment nominally controls the production of advertisements, but as a practical matter
has delegated control over the speech to a particular group that represents only one
segment of the population" (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
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ficient.1 1 5 The immediate result of the Court's decision is that future
challenges to the compelled advertising subsidies required by the agri-
cultural checkoff programs will center on the rather fact-specific ques-
tion of the Secretary's control over the message. However, the more
important doctrinal question is, even accepting that the Secretary
does exercise sufficient control over the ads as to label them govern-
ment speech, whether there is any limit at all to the government's
power to compel taxpayers to subsidize such speech. Livestock Market-
ing asserts that there is not. The remainder of this Note endeavors to
prove that there is.
II. SUBSIDIZING GOVERNMENT SPEECH-A NECESSARY EVIL
The Court's government speech doctrine is relatively new and
not yet fully defined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the government has
a largely unlimited power to control the messages expressed in its offi-
cial organs and the organs it endorses, even if they favor a particular
point of view. 1 16 It is also clear that this power does not extend to
cases where the government is simply facilitating private speech.
117
The Court has never announced a definitive test to distinguish gov-
ernment speech from the government's facilitation of private speech,
but in Livestock Marketing, it found that the Secretary's control over the
beef ads was sufficient to label them government speech.1 18 This was
true even though only a limited constituency-beef producers-was
115 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 562 ("When, as here, the government sets the over-
all message to be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is
not precluded from relying on the government speech doctrine merely because it
solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages.").
116 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); VOLOKH, supra note 60,
at 400; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) (holding that the govern-
ment is not required to communicate its message itself, but may pay private parties to
do so and thus, in allocating federal grants to family planning services, could condi-
tion funding on the service's agreement not to recommend abortion as an appropri-
ate method of family planning); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
545 (1983) (holding that Congress had the power to refuse to subsidize the lobbying
activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by prohibiting them from using tax-
deductible contributions to support their lobbying efforts).
117 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
(explaining that government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when it
administers a program that indiscriminately "encourage[s] a diversity of views from
private speakers"); VOLOKH, supra note 60, at 400 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velaz-
quez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001)).
118 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 561-62.
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taxed for the ads, 119 and even though the ads did not identify the
government as the source of the message.
Different rules apply when the government compels individuals
to fund its own speech rather than the speech of others. The govern-
ment may not compel individuals to subsidize private speech unless it
is germane to a compelling state interest. 120 However, the govern-
ment may compel individuals to subsidize its own message without
triggering First Amendment review. 12 1 Although the dissenter com-
pelled to subsidize a government message is undoubtedly injured, the
injury isjustifiedbecause the government is ultimately accountable to
its citizens for the message it conveys.
The ranchers' First Amendment claim in Livestock Marketing can
be divided into three parts. First, the ranchers argued that the gov-
ernment violated their freedom of association when it forced them to
contribute to, and thereby associate with, the Beef Board against their
will.122 Second, they argued that the ads' tagline "Funded by
America's Beef Producers," attributed the government's message to
them, violating their freedom of expression. 123 Finally, they argued
that the forced payment made them instruments of an objectionable
message, violating their freedom of belief.' 24 However, with the ads
recast as government (rather than private) speech, the strength of
those claims melted away.
First, while an individual has a right not to associate with a private
group such as a teachers union, the Court explained that the individ-
ual has no similar right not to associate with government. 12 5 Thus, by
labeling the Beef Board as "controlled by" a government agent, the
Court deemed that the ranchers had no right not to associate with
it.126 Second, the Court held that the beef ads were not "sufficiently
specific" to be attributed to any particular rancher simply because the
ads claimed to be sponsored by "America's Beef Producers."127 Never-
theless, the Court did reserve the possibility that ranchers could pre-
119 Id. at 554.
120 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977); see supra Part I.B.
121 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 557-59.
122 Id. at 555-56.
123 Id. at 564.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 559 ("'[Clompelled support of a private association is fundamentally
different from compelled support of government.'" (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 259
n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment))).
126 Id. at 560. The Court finessed this question when it specifically declined to
determine whether the Beef Board was actually a government entity, instead finding
that the Secretary's control over it was sufficient to render the question moot. Id. n.4.
127 Id. at 566-67.
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sent an as-applied challenge to a specific ad if it directly attributed its
message to them as individuals.
128
As to the ranchers' claim that the forced payment infringed upon
their freedom of belief, Abood and United Foods had indicated that this
freedom alone was the fundamental basis of the right against com-
pelled subsidization. 129 Thus, the government has no power, absent a
compelling state interest, to intrude upon this freedom by compelling
an individual to subsidize private speech she disagrees with. However,
the government has free reign to compel subsidies for its own speech,
regardless of the dissenter's beliefs. The explanation the Court has
offered is that the government, as the representative of the people, is
ultimately accountable to the people for what it says and this account-
ability ameliorates the dissenter's injury.130 If accountability is the jus-
tification for the government's power, then the question Livestock
Marketing raises is how the government can be deemed "accountable"
for government speech that is paid for by only a small group of taxpay-
ers and that does not identify the government as the speaker.
The government's right to speak flows from practical necessity
rather than firm legal principle. The state, if it is to govern effectively,
must communicate with its citizens because citizens vest the state with
great discretion over issues that materially affect their daily lives. As
the Court explained in Keller, if the state did not have the ability to
speak and to explain its use of that discretion, public debate "would
be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of govern-
ment as we know it would be radically transformed."'13 1
If government is to speak, it needs to pay the costs of disseminat-
ing that speech and, as such, it is inevitable that it will allocate some
tax dollars toward speech that some taxpayers disagree with. Accord-
ing to Wooley and Abood, that makes those taxpayers "instruments" of
the message and interferes with their First Amendment rights. 132 Nev-
ertheless, because it is essential that the government speak, their in-
jury becomes the price of their citizenship-it is among the costs of
life in ordered society.
As a matter of practical reality, a dissenting taxpayer cannot have
veto power over the messages his tax dollars support. At the outset,
administering such a refund system on a national scale would be cha-
128 Id. The Court's conclusion here would have been the same even if the ads
were labeled private speech.
129 See text accompanying supra notes 61-65, 107.
130 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000); Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13; infra notes 134-135.
131 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (citation omitted).
132 See supra notes 35-40, 45-55 and accompanying text.
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otic.133 More fundamentally, the government speaks as the people's
representative. In a democracy, people elect public officials, and
when those officials speak, they simply convey the will of the major-
ity.13 4 They remain accountable to the people for what they say. First,
when the government devotes taxes towards espousing a specific mes-
sage, it does so through a transparent budgeting process. Necessarily,
government's decision to spend money on the speech requires a par-
allel decision not to spend the money on something else and the peo-
ple are able to monitor those decisions. Second, the government
remains accountable because the people ultimately retain the power
to throw the government out when they tire of its message.
135
An individual has a liberty interest in not being compelled to sub-
sidize a message with which she disagrees. However, when she is com-
pelled to subsidize a government message, that interest is overcome by
society's interest in retaining the government's voice in the market-
place of ideas. When safeguards guaranteeing the government's ac-
countability are in place, her liberty interest is "served," even if "not
necessarily satisfied, by the political process as a check on what gov-
ernment chooses to say."
136
III. LIVESTOCK MARKETING -HOLDING THE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABLE FOR WHAT IT CHOOSES To SAY
The government is justified in compelling a dissenter to subsidize
government speech only when it is accountable for what it says. The
ranchers in Livestock Marketing argued that the government was not
accountable for the beef ads in that case: (1) because the ads were
financed by a targeted tax rather than a general one,13 7 and (2) be-
cause the government did not identify itself as the speaker. 138 Despite
133 See Keller, 496 U.S. at 12-13; Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) ("To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's
veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace
of ideas' would be out of the question." (citation omitted)).
134 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235; Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("[T]he reason for permitting the government to compel the pay-
ment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the government is
representative of the people."); see Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 574-75 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
135 As the Court has explained, "When the government speaks ... it is, in the end,
accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citi-
zenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary
position." Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
136 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 575 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 562.
138 Id. at 564.
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these concerns, the Court held that the ads were still government
speech exempt from First Amendment review. Thus, the Court must
have concluded that government accountability was ensured in some
other way.
A. Government Speech Funded by Targeted Taxes-Is the Government Still
Accountable if Only Some Citizens Pay for Its Speech?
The government is accountable for speech funded by a general
tax because all citizens are equally burdened and thus, have an equal
incentive to monitor the government's speech. Nevertheless, the
Court in Livestock Marketing held that funding by a general tax was not
a prerequisite to labeling a message as "government speech."
1. The Incentive To Monitor Government Speech
Government speech financed by a general tax ensures that every
taxpayer has an equal incentive to monitor the government's speech.
The Court hinted at how important this safeguard is in providing ac-
countability in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth.13 9 In Southworth, a public university used mandatory stu-
dent activity fees to fund the expressive activities of various student
groups. 140 Although the Court labeled these activities as private
speech, it eschewed Aboods "germaneness" test as unworkable in the
university setting.1 4 1 Instead, it held that the university could allocate
the mandatory fee towards financing student groups' speech as long
as it did so in a viewpoint neutral manner.
1 4 2
The University did not argue that the student groups' activities
were government speech. However, in dicta, the Court explained that
if the speech was "financed by tuition dollars" and "the University and its
officials were responsible for its content," the Court might have la-
beled the activities government speech. 14 3 Although this was only
dicta, the Court made a significant distinction between speech funded
by "tuition dollars" and speech funded by student activity fees. While
all students are compelled to pay both tuition and student activity
fees, only tuition (like a general tax) is allocated transparently. Uni-
versity speech programs funded by tuition dollars are included in the
University budget, approved by the trustees, and can be reviewed by
the public. Necessarily, the University's decision to fund its speech
139 529 U.S. 217.
140 Id. at 222-24.
141 Id. at 230.
142 Id. at 233.
143 Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
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requires a decision not to fund something else, and the public
monitors that choice. When the University funds speech through a
student activity fee, however, that decision is monitored less closely.
The University accounts for the student activity fee in its budget, but
once it does, the fee no longer competes with other University pro-
grams. When the University allocates that fee to various student
groups, it allocates power to some groups at the expense of others.
Regardless, that allocation decision only affects student groups. It
does not impact other constituencies of the university, such as faculty
or alumni, or give them an incentive to monitor.
The Beef Act operates the same way. It only taxes beef produc-
ers, and that tax is paid directly to the Beef Board. The tax never
passes through the general treasury, and thus does not attract the at-
tention of the everyday taxpayer. 144 The Beef Board is financially self-
sufficient-when it uses the tax revenues to finance the beef ads, it
does not take money away from any other government endeavor.
Despite the fact that the government will always be accountable
for what it says using a general tax, this is not a sufficiently compelling
reason to require the government to use a general tax every time it
speaks. The Court has explained as much, holding that "the First
Amendment [is not required to] duplicate[ ] the Appropriations
Clause... [such that] every instance of government speech be funded
by a line item in an appropriations bill." 14 5 Instead, there are other
ways to hold the government accountable for its speech when it pre-
fers not to require everyone to pay for it.
1
46
2. The Dissenter's Injury upon Being Compelled To Pay
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Livestock Marketing, re-
jected the ranchers' claim that the government may not impose the
costs of a government speech program on a targeted group alone.
Recalling Wooley, Justice Scalia acknowledged that while government
may not require an individual to personally express a message he dis-
agrees with, government is free to single out individuals or groups to
pay for that same message.
147
This holding relies on two distinctions. First, it distinguishes per-
sonally expressing a message from merely subsidizing it, finding that
the government may compel an individual to do the latter because the
144 Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub
nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
145 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 563.
146 See infra Part 1V.B.
147 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 557-59.
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act of simply making a payment is of sufficiently lower moral value
than actually affirming a message that the First Amendment will treat
it differently.148 Second, it distinguishes compelled payments for pri-
vate speech, which the Court has found "violate[ ] personal auton-
omy" when unconnected to any legitimate government purpose, from
compelled payments for government speech, which raise no similar
concerns.149 In fact, the Court recognized no distinction between
compelled payments for government speech extracted from targeted
groups and ones imposed on the nation at large. In either case, the
Court explained, the compulsion is simply a reality that every taxpay-
ing citizen must face.
150
Thus, the Court held that the individual and her conscience suf-
fer no greater injury when the government compels her to subsidize
its speech through a targeted tax than when it does so through a gen-
eral tax. 151 Ultimately, this conclusion is necessary, if not totally satis-
fying. The Court cited three cases to support the proposition, but
none truly justifies it. 1 5 2 Each precedent simply acknowledges the
government's power to compel taxpayers at large to subsidize its
148 See Klass, supra note 40, at 1116 (arguing that the principles underlying the
First Amendment right against compelled speech do not carry over to the supposed
right against compelled subsidization of speech because the compelled act-"paying a
mandatory fee"-is of "too little moral content").
149 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 565 n.8.
150 Id. at 559.
151 Id. at 562 ("Citizens ... have no First Amendment right not to fund govern-
ment speech. And that is no less true when the funding is achieved though targeted
assessments ... [rather than a general tax].").
152 Id. at 559. First, the Court cited Keller, which explained that "[i]f every citizen
were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which
he disagreed," this "heckler's veto" would prevent the government from entering the
public debate altogether. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (em-
phasis added). That statementjustifies government's use of general revenues to subsi-
dize its speech, but does not justify the government's use of targeted assessments for
the same purpose. The Court in Keller noted that "government officials are ex-
pected... to espouse the views of a majority of their constituents." Id. at 12. It is not
clear that government can claim the same role when the majority of its constituents
are not paying for its speech.
Next, the Court referred to Rosenberger, which discussed Rust's holding that gov-
ernment has the power to control what private speakers say when it pays them to carry
a government message. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995). Rust, however, does not lead to the conclusion that government may
target a specific group to subsidize its speech. The speech restriction in Rust was a
condition attached to the receipt of federal funds. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192
(1991). Thus, unlike the cattle ranchers, those subjected to it had voluntarily availed
themselves of a federal program with all the strings, including the speech require-
ment, attached.
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speech. None makes the additional analytical leap to find that the
government has the power to do the same to targeted groups. Never-
theless, even if Livestock Marketing was the first case to announce such
a rule, its announcement was inevitable.
The injury the dissenter suffers when she is compelled to subsi-
dize government speech through a general tax is overcome by soci-
ety's interest in hearing what the government has to say. If that injury
is made worse when she is compelled to subsidize government speech
through a targeted tax instead, the increase defies measurement. The
dissenter's conscience is injured the moment she is forced to contrib-
ute to the message. At that moment she becomes an instrument for
the speech and her First Amendment rights are implicated, even if she
is only forced to contribute a dime.
Therefore, the ranchers in Livestock Marketing had the task of
proving why the dissenter's injury is worse when she is only one of a
few people compelled to contribute. Dissenting, Justice Souter of-
fered two theories. First, when the government singles out a discrete
group to pay for its speech, "the particular interests of those singled
out to pay the tax are closely linked with the expression." 15 3 Second,
those who are singled out "suffer a more acute limitation on their
presumptive autonomy as speakers to decide what to say and what to
pay for others to say."' 154 Previously, lower courts had described these
observations as a "coerced nexus" between the subsidizer and the
speech. 1
55
Justice Souter's first point is that when the government conveys a
particular message, ("eat beef," for example) and compels a discrete
Finally, the Court pointed to Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wooley. Justice Rehn-
quist would have rejected Maynard's First Amendment claim because he did not be-
lieve that New Hampshire's message, imprinted on Maynard's license plate, was likely
to be attributed to Maynard. Rather, he found Maynard's injury analogous to the
injury suffered by the citizens in the following hypothetical: "[W]ere New Hampshire
to erect a multitude of billboards, each proclaiming 'Live Free or Die,' and tax all
citizens for the cost of erection and maintenance, clearly the message would be 'fos-
tered' by the individual citizen-taxpayers and just as clearly those individuals would be
'instruments' in that communication." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see supra notes 41-44 and accompany-
ing text. Justice Rehnquist found no distinction between Maynard's claim and the
claim of the taxpayers and would have rejected both. However, his hypothetical bill-
board tax applied to all citizens. Thus, his argument does not go so far as to endorse
the government's power to extract the same tax from targeted groups.
153 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 575-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154 Id.
155 Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 719 (8th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub
nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550; United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d
1119, 1131-32 (3d Cir. 1989).
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group (like beef producers) to subsidize that message, the group is
more "closely linked" with the message because the speech relates to
who they are-the speech is about beef and those in the group are
beef producers. Perhaps this is true. However, other dissenters feel
just as closely linked to government speech funded by general taxes.
If the government advocates the benefits of contraception, a propo-
nent of abstinence forced to pay for that speech through a general tax
will feel more "closely linked" to it than someone who is ambivalent
on the matter. If the government embarks on a campaign to persuade
a foreign government to change its social policies, a recent immigrant
from that country will feel more "closely linked" to the speech than
other Americans because the speech relates to who she is. There is no
objective criteria to explain why the link the beef producers feel to the
beef ads is any closer than the link the abstinence proponent or the
immigrant feels towards government speech that relates to them. The
flaw in the "close link" theory is that there is no principled way to
identify the point at which the link raises constitutional concerns.
Justice Souter's second point leads to a similar quandary. When
members of a discrete group are compelled to fund government
speech, he reasons, they suffer a more "acute limitation" on their au-
tonomy as speakers. 156 The point seems to be that targeted individu-
als subsidize a greater percentage of the disagreeable speech. If a
government imposed a general tax for government speech on a na-
tion of one hundred people, each person would only be forced to
contribute to one percent of the message. But, if the government
only imposed the tax on the ten lawyers in the nation, each would
shoulder ten percent of the burden. Thus, while the burden on the
general taxpayer is "comparatively minute and indeterminable," the
burden on the targeted taxpayer is a heavier load.1 57 Again, while this
might be true at the extreme, it does not explain precisely when the
burden becomes too heavy. The dissenter is made an instrument of
the message the moment she is compelled to support it against her
will, even when through a general tax. That injury, however, isjusti-
fied by the government's need to speak. The "coerced nexus" theory
contends that when the tax is imposed on a narrower pool of citizens,
the dissenting citizen supports a greater percentage of the message
and her injury is proportionately increased until, at some point, it be-
comes unconstitutional.
It would indeed be troubling if the government compelled a sin-
gle taxpayer to subsidize 100% of a particular message. However, it
156 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 575-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 576 n.4 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)).
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would not seem troubling at all if the government targeted a very
broad constituency to subsidize a government message related to a
common trait. For instance, a "Buckle-Up" campaign funded by auto
taxes would not seem to raise any difficulty. Instead, the difficulty
arises in identifying the point at which the "coerced nexus" between
the subsidizer and the speech is triggered.
The majority in Livestock Marketings holding allows the govern-
ment to impose the costs of a speech campaign on a targeted group,
no matter how small.' 58 The dissent's position does not, but that posi-
tion ultimately fails to identify the point at which the targeting goes
too far. This invites a frustrating and arbitrary line-drawing exercise
between permissible targeting and targeting that violates autonomy.
To avoid that morass, the only principled conclusion the dissent per-
mits is the one Justice Kennedy entertained in his separate dissent-
speech funded by a targeted tax cannot be protected as "government
speech" in any case. 159 Thus, the debate between the majority and
Justice Kennedy descends into a choice between extremes. Either the
government has the power to compel subsidies for its speech from any
constituency no matter how small, or the government has no power at
all to compel subsidies for its speech by means of anything besides a
general tax. While the latter would surely guarantee individual free-
dom of belief, in practice it would tie the government's hands consid-
erably. Taxes imposed on constituencies such as automobile drivers,
homeowners, or corporations could not be used for government
speech even though these groups seem too broad to claim a "coerced
nexus" with the government's message. Thus, the position Justice
Kennedy considered must ultimately fail.
An individual has the right not to be compelled to subsidize
speech she disagrees with because the compelled payment violates her
freedom of conscience. That violation is sanctioned when the com-
pulsion comes in the form of a general tax. Ultimately, the violation is
not made appreciably worse when the compulsion comes in the form
of a targeted assessment. The dissenting individual's injury arises
from the incompatibility of her conscience with the message she is
forced to support, not the number of dissenters compelled along with
158 Id. at 565 n.8 ("Apportioning the burden of funding government operations
(including speech) through taxes and other levies does not violate autonomy simply
because individual taxpayers feel 'singled out' or find the exaction 'galling."').
159 Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I would reserve for another day the diffi-
cult First Amendment questions that would arise if the government were to target a
discrete group of citizens to pay even for speech that the government does 'embrace
as publicly as it speaks."' (quoting id. at 580 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
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her or the percentage of the final message that her contribution ulti-
mately supports.
Thus, if there is a limit to the government's power to target dis-
crete groups and compel them to subsidize its speech, that limit
comes from a source other than the First Amendment's protection of
the freedom of conscience, the sine qua non of the right against com-
pelled speech and subsidization since Wooley and Abood. Obviously,
the government does not have the power to extract taxes from suspect
classes under the Equal Protection Clause or to tax a single individual,
by himself, into bankruptcy. Neither limit, however, has anything to
do with the dissenter's conscience or the government's speech, and
both fall outside the scope of the First Amendment. To find a First
Amendment limit to this government power requires breaking with
Abood and isolating some other core principle besides the dissenter's
freedom of belief that would justify her right to resist the tax. Justice
Souter's dissent, at least indirectly, offered an alternative: the First
Amendment's interest in preventing distortion of the marketplace of
ideas.
B. Anonymous Government Speech-Is the Government Still Accountable if
No One Knows It is Talking?
Justice Souter noted that targeted speech taxes increase the dis-
senting subsidizer's injury, but was unwilling to commit to the ex-
treme position that government cannot compel targeted groups to
subsidize its speech in any circumstances. Instead, he found that the
First Amendment harms raised by this practice could be solved if the
government affirmatively identified itself as the source of the
speech.
160
The First Amendment tolerates the government's use of tax dol-
lars to fund its own speech because the government is accountable for
what it says. While the majority in Livestock Marketing found that the
government is accountable for any message controlled by a politically
accountable official, Justice Souter concluded that the government's
accountability could only be achieved when the government "indi-
cat[es] that the content actually is a government message," which will
160 Id. at 571-72 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is not certain whether Justice Souter
would hold that government must always identify itself before its speech may be la-
beled "government speech," or whether the rule only applies to government speech
funded by targeted assessments. Conversely, in a separate opinion, Justice Ginsburg
made clear that she believes that all government speech must be subject to this rule.
Id. at 569-70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
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sometimes even require the government to "explicitly label[ ] the
speech as its own."
16 1
Importantly, this rule was quite close to becoming law, as three
Justices signed Justice Souter's dissent and a fourth, Justice Ginsburg,
endorsed it separately.1 62 Consequently, it is conceivable that this rule
might still gain a majority in the case of a compelled subsidy for gov-
ernment speech more ideologically charged than the commercial ad-
vertisements produced under the Beef Act.
However, the burden imposed by a rule that requires the govern-
ment to identify itself as the source of all its speech should not be
underestimated. While the First Amendment protects the individual's
right to engage in anonymous speech, Justice Souter's rule denies the
government the same ability. While Justice Souter implied that the
purpose behind the rule was to vindicate the ranchers' liberty interest
and remove any risk that the beef ads would be attributed to them
specifically, I submit that an alternative and perhaps more compelling
reason to require the government to identify itself as the source of its
speech is the preservation of the integrity of the marketplace of ideas.
1. The Risk of Distorting the Marketplace of Ideas
The beef ads were created by the government, yet purported to
be "Funded by America's Beef Producers." When the government
places ads such as these in the marketplace of ideas without acknowl-
edging its authorship, it distorts the market to some degree. The ads
lead viewers to assume that a group of "America's Beef Producers"
believe in the ads' message enough to pay for them. Viewers are not
made aware that some producers only contribute because they are re-
quired to by law. Consequently, the viewers perceive that public sup-
port for the beef ads' message is greater than it actually is. If the
government simply labels the ads as its own, however, the problem is
solved. Viewers recognize the ads as government speech and assess
them while fully comprehending their source. But, when the govern-
ment speaks anonymously, as it did in Livestock Marketing, perceptions
are distorted.
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,163 the Court explained
that the First Amendment protects against such distortion. 64 In Aus-
tin, the Court upheld a state statute that prohibited business corpora-
tions from using corporate funds to support or oppose candidates for
161 Id. at 571-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 569-70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).




state office. 16 5 Despite the imposition on the corporation's right of
political expression, the Court upheld the ban in the interest of
preventing "corruption" in the political arena, defined as "the corro-
sive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth ... accu-
mulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."
' 16 6
The Court was concerned that corporate ideas had acquired a
market share disproportionate to their actual public support. It rea-
soned that shareholders associate with corporations to make a profit
rather than to espouse political beliefs and, consequently, a corpora-
tion's coffers do not accurately represent its shareholders' political
views. 16 7 The same distortion results when the government compels a
targeted group to subsidize its speech and does not take credit as the
source. For instance, the ranchers in Livestock Marketing do not con-
tribute to the Beef Board for the purpose of disseminating shared
views. Instead, they associate because they are required to by law.
Importantly, the Court in Austin was concerned with distortion in
the marketplace of political ideas, a concern that might not trickle
down to commercial ads. However, the Court in Livestock Marketing
asserted that all compelled subsidies for government speech are "ex-
empt" from First Amendment review, regardless of the content of the
speech. 168 If the Court is ever required to examine a compelled sub-
sidy for anonymous government speech of a political or ideological
tint, it will find Austin in tension with that assertion. In such a case,
the Court will need to determine whether Austin's interest in cali-
brating the quantity of corporate speech to its actual public support
applies only to corporations or whether it applies to other speakers,
such as the government, as well.
In Austin, the Court explained that corporations have the capac-
ity to "drown out" other speakers and, thus, their speech must be ex-
amined more closely. Similarly, lower courts have held that the
government also has the capacity to "drown out" other speakers. 169
On that basis, government speech has the same potential to distort
the marketplace of ideas. While that risk may be sufficient to deny the
government the power to speak anonymously, such a rule imposes a
heavy burden not to be accepted lightly.
165 Id. at 654-55.
166 Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added).
167 Id. at 665-66.
168 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
169 E.g., Warner Cable Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638 (11th
Cir. 1990) ("[G]overnment may not speak so loudly as to make it impossible for other
speakers to be heard . . ").
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2. The Risks of Prohibiting Anonymous Government Speech
In Livestock Marketing, Justice Souter's dissent criticized the gov-
ernment for essentially talking out both sides of its mouth. While the
Department of Health and Human Services warned the public against
excessive beef consumption, the Department of Agriculture anony-
mously extolled the virtues of beef in the beef ads. 170 As a result, he
concluded, the government escaped accountability for its message
and could not justify using the targeted assessment to fund that
speech. His proposed solution, a requirement that the government
disclose itself as the source of its speech before the speech is ex-
empted from First Amendment review, prevents the government from
acting underhandedly in the marketplace of ideas, distorting it, and as
a result, impeding citizens' ability to locate the information they need
to be able to participate effectively in a democratic republic. 171
However, denying the government the ability to speak anony-
mously imposes significant constraints on its ability to function.
Before identifying this rule as a limit to the government's power. to
compel subsidies for government speech, it must be proven to ade-
quately address the First Amendment harms the practice raises while
remaining consistent with the theoretical justification for permitting
government speech.
The First Amendment grants the individual the right to speak
anonymously for two reasons. First, anonymity protects the speaker
from immediate retaliation for the content of her speech. Second,
anonymity removes the danger that bias against the speaker will eradi-
cate the persuasive ability of her message. 172 Obviously, the govern-
ment is not vulnerable to retaliation for its speech. However, it is
susceptible to bias. 173 As the Supreme Court has explained, anonym-
ity allows an unpopular speaker to guarantee that listeners "will not
170 Livestock Mktg., 544 U.S. at 578 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting). One could argue
even further that the government did more than just speak anonymously, but deliber-
ately sought to deceive the public by attributing the ads to "America's Beef Produc-
ers." Perhaps such actions should receive tighter scrutiny than occasions when the
government is simply silent regarding the source of its speech. For a more glaring
example, consider the Bush Administration's creation of phony newscasts praising
federal policies. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 983, 983 (2005).
171 See Lee, supra note 170, at 988-89 (arguing that the legitimacy of government
speech depends on the public's ability to identify the government as speaker).
172 For a more extensive analysis of these questions, see Richard M. Cardillo, Note,
I Am Publius, and I Approve This Message: The Baffling and Conflicted State of Anonymous




prejudge her message simply because they do not like its propo-
nent."1 74 In other words, unpopular speakers have ideas too, and the
First Amendment will not deprive those ideas of a fair opportunity to
be heard by tethering them to their unpalatable advocates. This ratio-
nale applies with equal force to government speech. At times, such as
during a war or recession, no speaker is more unpopular than the
government and ideas labeled as belonging to the government will
struggle to gain traction in the public domain. When those ideas have
merit, a rule denying government the power to shield its identity may
do more harm than good.
For example, after the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)'s much-maligned response to Hurricane Katrina, the agency
was roundly criticized as incompetent and was not afforded much re-
spect.175 Had another emergency struck soon after, citizens might
have ignored FEMA's calls to evacuate because of its recent debacle.
It would then have been beneficial for FEMA to get the message out
in some other way, through intermediaries, state officials, celebrities,
anyone but the agency in such low public esteem. Thus, in some cir-
cumstances, the government's interest in anonymity might justify dis-
torting the marketplace of ideas.
If the requirement that the government identify itself as the
source of government speech can operate as an appropriate limit to
the government's power to compel subsidies from targeted groups,
the requirement must adequately address the First Amendment harms
compelled subsidization raises. As Livestock Marketing showed, the dis-
senter's freedom of thought is not injured in a cognizable way when
she is compelled to subsidize government speech. In addition, her
freedom of expression is not implicated unless the government specif-
ically attributes the message to her. Thus, the only function remain-
ing forJustice Souter's requirement to serve is preventing the risk that
anonymous government speech will distort the marketplace of ideas.
The risk of market distortion was not discussed in Abood and its prog-
eny as a central principle underlying the right against compelled sub-
sidization. However, the Court's previous silence does not suggest
that the risk is any less real or that the risk cannot be identified now as
a reason to limit the government's ability to compel targeted individu-
als to subsidize its speech.1
76
174 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
175 See, e.g., Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk, but Not Levee
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al; Josh White & Peter Whoriskey, Planning,
Response Are Faulted, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al.
176 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's more recent
recognition of market distortion as a basis for the right against compelled speech).
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At base, this source disclosure requirement simply seeks to ensure
that the government remains accountable for the content of its
speech. As explained in Part III.A, practical concerns argue against
enforcing this accountability by requiring the government to fund its
speech only through general taxes. While government accountability
can be ensured through Justice Souter's source disclosure rule, the
rule is in tension with the First Amendment's historical protection of
anonymous speech. This protection stems from the traditional under-
standing that ideas should rise and fall on their own merit and ,that
citizens are both smart and engaged enough to distinguish ideas with
merit from those with none.1 77 Thus, adoptingJustice Souter's source
disclosure rule in pursuit of one First Amendment goal would require
sacrificing another. Ultimately however, the government can still be
held accountable for the content of its speech through a third way.
Thus, the source disclosure rule should remain a remedy of last
resort.
IV. COUNTER-SPEECH-HOLDING THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE IN
ANOTHER WAY
Livestock Marketing held that the government may compel
targeted groups to subsidize the government's commercial advertise-
ments. This holding is consistent with the principles underlying the
First Amendment. First, regardless of whether the compelled subsidy
actually interferes with the dissenter's freedom of conscience, the in-
terference is justified by society's interest in hearing what the govern-
ment has to say. That interference is not made worse, at least not in a
measurable way, when the subsidy is compelled through a targeted
assessment rather than a general tax. Second, while the government
did distort the marketplace of ideas by anonymously disseminating the
beef ads, the Court has never found distortion to raise First Amend-
ment problems when the source of the distortion is commercial
speech.
Nevertheless, the Court's assertion in Livestock Marketing that all
compelled subsidies for government speech are "exempt" from First
Amendment review is troublingly broad. While the government does
177 See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 804 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that, in that case, the Court had departed from its
"traditional understanding... that.., it is safer to assume that the people are smart
enough to get the information they need than to assume that the government [in
requiting speakers to identify themselves] is wise or impartial enough to make the
judgment for them"). But see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003) (upholding
a statute that required political campaigns to disclose the names of their donors);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (same).
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have the power to compel targeted constituencies to subsidize com-
mercial government speech, First Amendment principles make clear
that this power does not extend to compelled subsidies for political or
ideological government speech.
1 78
A. Counter-Speech, Commercial Speech, and the Limit to the Government's
Power To Tax and Speak Anonymously
Compelled subsidization of government speech is justified as
long as the government is accountable for what it says. That accounta-
bility can be ensured in three ways. First, government speech funded
through a general tax forces all citizens to share the burden equally
and gives them an equal incentive to monitor the government's
speech. Alternatively, government speech that is attributed to the gov-
ernment alerts those who receive the message of its source and allows
them to evaluate it accordingly. Finally, even if neither of those safe-
guards is in place, the government will remain accountable for its
speech funded by a compelled subsidy if adequate opportunities for
counter-speech exist.
When individuals speak out against the subsidy and the message
it funds, they force the government to become accountable and re-
verse any distortion of the market caused by the government's anony-
mous speech. Regardless of the burden that compelled subsidies
place on dissenters' consciences, they do not prevent them from en-
gaging in this counter-speech. Thus, in Livestock Marketing, although
the cattle ranchers were compelled to subsidize the beef ads against
their will, they remained free to rebut every assertion the ads made.
However, the effectiveness of counter-speech as a means to en-
sure the government's accountability and prevent distortion of the
marketplace of ideas diminishes when the government's speech is
ideologically based. It is more likely and less troubling that the cattle
ranchers will publicly rebut the economic message conveyed in the
beef ads than that another group will enter the public debate to rebut
an ideological message they are compelled to subsidize through a
targeted tax. Consider the facts presented by Summit Medical Center,
Inc. v. Riley. 179 In Summit, the State of Alabama required abortion
providers to purchase informational materials from the State Depart-
ment of Health and provide them to their clients. These materials
consisted of pamphlets and a videocassette that detailed alternatives
178 See Troy, supra note 9, at 147 (predicting that because of its breadth, the
"Court will almost certainly have to impose some kind of limitation on the govern-
ment-speech doctrine it espoused in Johanns").
179 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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to abortion, informed the woman of the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the unborn child, and concluded with the salvo that
"'the State of Alabama strongly urges you"' to contact agencies pro-
viding pregnancy services other than abortion before making a final
decision.180 This speech was financed by a compelled minority-abor-
tion providers-but the government accepted full credit for the
speech, thus eliminating the risk that the marketplace of ideas would
be distorted. Imagine, however, that the materials the abortion prov-
iders were compelled to purchase purported to come from "Ala-
bama's Health Care Providers." Would the abortion providers in
Summit then have a stronger claim than the cattle ranchers in Livestock
Marketing' I submit that they would, and the reason stems from the
nature of the speech they would be compelled to subsidize.
Both the ranchers and the hypothetical abortionists are made in-
struments of a message they disagree with. While one might plausibly
argue that it is normatively worse to be made an instrument of an
ideological or political message one disagrees with rather than to be
made an instrument of a commercial one, the Court as recently as
United Foods has declined to evaluate the subjective merits of an indi-
vidual's purported ideological disagreement.'18 Thus, the reason the
government has the power to compel subsidies for anonymous com-
mercial government speech but not for anonymous ideological gov-
ernment speech has nothing to do with the dissenter's conversion into
an instrument for the message. Instead, the reason for the difference
is that only the government's anonymous ideological speech is likely
to distort the marketplace of ideas. It is necessary to provide added
protection against the distortion the government's ideological speech
can cause because ideological speech implicates the right not to
speak 82 in a way that commercial speech does not.
As the Court has explained, an individual compelled to serve as
an instrument of a message he disagrees with will often feel compelled
to respond.' 8 3 In other words, he will attempt to undo the benefit his
compelled subsidy has provided the objectionable message by rebut-
180 Id. at 1353-54. Predating the Court's decision in Livestock Marketing, the court
in Summit employed the "coerced nexus" theory and struck the provision down. Al-
though it acknowledged that the materials were government speech, it found that
Alabama had no compelling justification for limiting the financial burdens of the
speech to abortion providers only, explaining that "[a]lthough the State's interest in
monetary savings is legitimate, it cannot overcome the First Amendment interests at
stake in this case." Id. at 1361.
181 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001).
182 See supra text accompanying note 26.
183 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1986).
[VOL. 81:52094
SPEECH AND TAXES
ting it with his own speech. In doing so, he sacrifices his right not to
speak. As a result, he surrenders his control over the identity he
presents to the outside world and his freedom of expression. He also
assumes the risk that he will be retaliated against for what he has to
say. He does this because a message he disagrees with was placed in
the marketplace of ideas with his financial support and he feels
obliged to strip that message of this advantage and reestablish the
market equilibrium that existed before the speech subsidy was
imposed.
When the compelled dissenter engages in counter-speech to re-
but a political or ideological message he is forced to subsidize, he sur-
renders his constitutional right not to speak. However, when he
engages in counter-speech to rebut a commercial message, he does
not make the same sacrifice because the right not to speak does not
extend to commercial affairs. To be sure, the Court has made clear
that, absent a compelling state interest, the government may not com-
pel an individual to personally express a message, even a commercial
one, against his will.184 Doing so would interfere with the individual's
freedom of expression. However, the Court has never gone so far as
to identify a constitutional problem with the government compelling
a taxpayer to subsidize its commercial speech and thus compelling the
taxpayer to rebut the speech with a message of his own. There is good
reason for this.
The First Amendment protects the individual's right not to speak
on political and ideological matters. In its interest in a free and ro-
bust debate, the First Amendment encourages individuals to speak out
in support of the views they believe in. Nevertheless, it still protects
the individual's right to remain silent because countervailing con-
cerns may lead some prospective speakers to decline the opportunity.
An opponent of the death penalty may work at a place, live in a family,
or worship at a church where the death penalty is held in high regard.
He might not wish to reveal this aspect of his conscience to those
around him for fear that they will retaliate, criticize, or shun him.
While he might be called a coward, the First Amendment does not
require every citizen to be an active player in the marketplace of ideas.
To the contrary, were he to be compelled to speak out against the
death penalty, the identity our timid speaker presents to the outside
184 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). The
Riley Court struck down a statute compelling professional fundraisers to disclose the
way in which contributions to their charity were allocated to potential donors. Even
though the compelled speech was limited to commercial facts, the Court applied
strict scrutiny and found that the fundraisers' solicitation was "intertwined with in-
formative and perhaps persuasive speech." Id.
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world would be transformed, and the First Amendment grants him
full autonomy over that presentation. If he chooses to omit his oppo-
sition to the death penalty from that public identity, that choice is
protected by his right not to speak.
However, the countervailing concerns that counsel the speaker
toward silence simply do not apply to commercial speech. While the
First Amendment appropriately shields the meek from wearing their
political and ideological colors on their sleeves, it need not be con-
cerned with protecting individuals from disclosing their financial in-
terests. While the speaker faces ostracism or retaliation upon
disclosing an unpopular political or ideological thought, she faces no
similar risk in disclosing her interest in conducting transactions for
profit. In America, with its rich capitalist tradition, it is expected and
even admired for the individual to defend her own financial well be-
ing. Engaging in self-interested commercial speech does not subject
the speaker to scorn or retaliation.
The right not to speak is also protected because silence itself is
expressive.1 8 5 By choosing not to say anything, especially when the
moment calls for it, the individual expresses a great deal about her-
self. Yet deciding not to speak up for one's economic interests reveals
little, if anything at all. It simply reveals that those interests must not
be the type of interests the speaker is willing to defend.
Consider again the hypothetical abortionists. They decide not to
speak in support of or in opposition to legalized abortion. Con-
sciously, they believe that the practice is ethical and that the moral
and religious objections to it are misguided. Further, their conduct
obviously confirms such a belief. Nevertheless, their silence expresses
something too. In declining to take a firm position in the debate, in
not contributing to the National Abortion and Reproduction Rights
Action League or some other prominent body in the pro-choice move-
ment, they attempt to express something about themselves, perhaps
that they are "above the fray" of the back-and-forth politics on this
divisive issue. They support and engage in the practice, but are not
"militants" in the pro-choice crusade. The First Amendment protects
their right to shape their identity as such. The state's requirement
that they pay for informational materials that "strongly encourage"
women to consider other options and imply that the practice is in-
deed immoral advances a belief that the abortionists oppose. The
message is hostile to their consciences and it is launched into the mar-
ketplace of ideas on the strength of funds from their own pockets.
This coerces the abortionists into speaking. To strip the government's
185 See Klass, supra note 40, at 1110.
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message of the advantage their compelled payment has provided and
to reestablish the market equilibrium that existed before the govern-
ment allocated their payments towards the objectionable speech, the
abortionists are required to speak up. Thus, the subsidy baits the
abortionist into the full throws of an active public debate. In jumping
in and speaking his mind, the abortionist assumes a new identity. His
beliefs are no longer unstated. He stands for something now, and
may be scorned or embraced depending on how society absorbs what
he has to say.
In contrast, consider the cattle rancher. He chooses not to adver-
tise his products but is then compelled to subsidize a government ad-
vertising campaign that describes all beef as homogenous and
diminishes his claim that his own beef is unique. On the strength of
his compelled payments, the government has advanced an idea inimi-
cal to his interests, even if not contrary to his beliefs. In engaging in
his own speech and attempting to rebut the government's message,
the cattle rancher surrenders his prior silence. But in so doing, he
does not make the same sacrifice as the abortionist who is compelled
to subsidize ideological speech. By breaking his silence, the rancher
does not express anything about himself to the world that the world
did not already know. He wants consumers to buy the products he
offers for sale. The world already learned this, however, when he put
those products up for sale in the first place. The abortionist is differ-
ent. He performs abortions and in so doing demonstrates that he be-
lieves the practice is acceptable. But that act alone does not express
how or why he believes this is so. It does not explain whether he be-
lieves that a woman has an inviolable right to privacy in her own body
or whether he believes the question is simply a policy choice and that
the current choice is acceptable. The urge he feels to counter-speak
and rebut the government message that he is compelled to subsidize
forces him to resolve this ambiguity and express himself where he oth-
erwise would not.
The cattle rancher who feels the urge to commence an advertis-
ing campaign for his own products in order to rebut the government's
harmful speech does not suffer the same loss. He reveals nothing
more about himself when he says "buy my steaks" than he does when
he offers steaks for sale without saying anything. By disclosing his in-
terest in selling his product after having already entered the commer-
cial marketplace by putting his products up for sale, the rancher has
not disclosed anything new about himself that the world did not al-
ready know. In terminating his silence, he has not altered his identity
and has not surrendered his freedom of expression.
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Identifying this distinction between compelled subsidies for com-
mercial speech and speech of an ideological nature does not conflict
with the Court's recent inclination to treat restrictions on commercial
speech on a more equal footing with restrictions on the historically
protected categories of speech.' 8 6 Some argue that restrictions of
commercial speech should be treated exactly the same as restrictions
on political speech because both evince the government's intent to
shield society from certain messages and because failing to protect
commercial speech provides a convenient avenue for the government
to deny protection to speakers with something unpopular to say.
18 7
Further, compulsions of commercial speech have, at times, received
the same treatment as compulsions of other categories of speech be-
cause both interfere with the speaker's freedom of expression.
1
88
However, a compulsion to subsidize the government's commercial
speech and the accompanying likelihood that the compelled subsi-
dizer will feel compelled to rebut the speech does not raise the same
concerns as compelled subsidies for political or ideological speech.
The compelled subsidizer of the government's commercial speech
may rebut the message without revealing anything new about herself
that the world did not already know before. Hence, she can be relied
upon to speak up and hold the government accountable.
B. A New Solution to a Difficult Problem
Thus, the rule to be applied in such cases is as follows: the gov-
ernment may compel citizens to subsidize its speech as long as it re-
mains accountable for what it says. This accountability can be
achieved in any one of three ways. First, the government may finance
the speech through a general tax, ensuring that each citizen is equally
burdened and each has an equal incentive to monitor the message. If
the government instead chooses to compel a targeted constituency to
subsidize its speech, it can still be held accountable in two other ways.
First, the government can simply identify itself as the speaker and al-
low recipients to judge its message accordingly. Alternatively, even if
the government chooses to remain anonymous, it can still be held
accountable for its speech if there is a sufficient likelihood that those
186 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (finding that a
complete statutory ban on price advertising for alcoholic beverages abridged speech
in violation of the First Amendment).
187 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 649-50 (1990).
188 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (explaining that when commercial speech is "inextricably
intertwined" with informative and persuasive speech to form one solicitation, the
Court will apply its test for "fully protected expression").
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burdened by the message will speak up against it and demand that the
government defend its position. This will only occur, however, when
the content of the speech is commercial. Taxpayers compelled to sub-
sidize a commercial message hostile to their own position have no
right or incentive to remain silent and can be relied upon to chal-
lenge the government's speech. Conversely, taxpayers compelled to
subsidize ideological or political speech do have both a right and an
incentive to remain silent and cannot be relied upon to speak up and
hold the government accountable. Further, even if they do speak up,
they surrender their right not to speak in a way the compelled subsi-
dizer of commercial speech does not. That additional burden on
their First Amendment interest is sufficiently substantial to earn them
added protection.
Thus, under this rule, the government would have the power to
compel the cattle ranchers in Livestock Marketing to subsidize its com-
mercial speech even though the ranchers disagreed with the message
and even though the government spoke anonymously. The injury to
the ranchers' freedom of conscience is no worse than that of those
compelled to pay general taxes and any distortion the beef ads cre-
ated in the marketplace of ideas can be expected to be reversed by the
ranchers' counter-speech.18 9
The State of Alabama, however, would not have the power to
compel the hypothetical abortionists to subsidize its ideological
speech while remaining anonymous. While it is true that the injury to
the abortionists' freedom of conscience is also no worse than a gen-
eral taxpayer's, in this example, the distortion to the marketplace of
ideas caused by Alabama's anonymous speech is unlikely to be cured
by the abortionists' counter-speech because countervailing concerns
may keep them silent.
The scope of this rule is narrow, however. The State of Alabama
would still have the power to compel the abortionists to subsidize its
ideological message as long as the State of Alabama simply identified
itself as the source of the message. The abortionists have no First
Amendment right not to pay for government speech they disagree
with. However, society does have the right to hold the government
accountable for what it says and the abortionists do have a right not to
189 But see Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association,
Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. Rrv. 641, 645 (2001). Tribe, who argued the ranchers' case
before the Supreme Court, finds that the individual has a "right not to be appropri-
ated or conscripted as a means to the state's speech-related ends." Id. Thus, he con-
cludes that the state can just as easily achieve its legitimate goals by "speaking with its
own voice, at the expense of all taxpayers rather than just those few who are singled
out to bear the burden of serving as the state's microphone." Id.
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be burdened with the responsibility of providing that accountability by
engaging in their own ideological counter-speech.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Livestock Marketing suggested that all taxes that com-
pel individuals to subsidize government speech are "exempt" from
First Amendment review. Despite the apparent breadth of this asser-
tion, this Note reveals that in most situations, this should indeed be
the case. However, the government's power to compel targeted
groups to subsidize its speech is not without limit. Every time the gov-
ernment speaks, it must ultimately remain accountable for what it
says. If the government compels a targeted group to fund its speech
on a topic that is not merely commercial, the government must affirm-
atively identify itself as the speaker or the compulsion must fail as a
violation of the First Amendment.
